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I. INTRODUCTION
Allen Linden loves torts.' Justice Linden also cherishes strong
communities whose members care for each other. As someone who has
studied and worked both in Canada and the United States, Professor Linden
knows the benefits that can be gained by being less provincial and opening
yourself up to the experience of other legal systems.2 Not only might you
realize how to improve yours, but also you might be able to offer insights to
* Stephen D. Sugarman is the Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law at the University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law.
1. See THE JOY OF TORTS (Stiphane Beaulac et al. eds., 2003) See generally ALLEN M.
LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW (Allen M. Linden & Bruce Feldthusen eds., 8th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter CANADIAN TORT LAW]; JEAN-Louis BAUDOUIN & ALLEN M. LINDEN, TORT LAW IN
CANADA (2010).
2. Stephen D. Sugarman, Presenting the Fleming Award to Justice Allen Linden at Pepperdine
University School ofLaw, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 925, 925 (2006).
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others. As part of this symposium honoring Allen Linden, my contribution
acknowledges all three of these values by looking at the monetary benefits
provided by tort law and other compensation systems in the United States
and elsewhere.
II. THREE TYPES OF COMPENSATION SCHEMES FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURY
VICTIMS
I start by emphasizing three roles that government can play in providing
compensation to people who suffer bodily injury by accident.
1. Government can provide accident victims with legal rights to sue
those who have injured them (and make forums available where victims can
enforce those rights). Tort law epitomizes this role.
2. Government can create general social insurance arrangements that
provide compensation for lost income and pay for the medical (and perhaps
related) expenses that accident victims incur. In the United States, Medicare
pays for health care for the elderly and the totally disabled, Medicaid (and
related plans) pays for the health care needs of the poor, and tax subsidies
support our vast network of employer-provided health insurance. In Canada
and most other rich nations, a comprehensive national health care system
deals with this need. With regard to income replacement, in the United
States as elsewhere, Social Security provides compensation to totally-
disabled former workers and their families.3 Some other countries provide
income support as well to workers who become partially disabled.
Although these schemes are available to accident victims, they do not
focus on any particular type of accident, and indeed, they are not at all
limited to accident victims.4 Those suffering from diseases and congenital
problems are also covered. Moreover, unlike compensation provided by tort
law that is paid for by injurers (albeit often spread to others engaged in
similar activities via liability insurance), social insurance is paid for by
broad funding bases, like payroll taxes and income taxes, that are not
connected to the cause of the accident that generates a claim for benefits.
3. In between these two extremes is a continuum of what has been
called tailored or focused compensation plans. Each of these provides
compensation to victims of a specific type of injury, compensation that is
made available other than through court-based litigation.5 Moreover, in
contrast to the anchoring norm of tort law, these tailored compensation plans
do not seek to blame those who cause the covered injuries. 6 Yet, in many
(but not all) instances, those whose conduct contributes to the need for
3. BARBARA SAMUELS, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5:5 (2d ed. 2010); 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2010).
4. See, e.g., CANADIAN TORT LAW, supra note 1, at 602 (providing an example of a court
considering whether artificial insemination that led patient to contract HIV could be held as a tort).
5. ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: STRENGTHENING THE
SOCIAL COMPACT 7 (1991).
6. See id at 2.
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compensation are asked to take responsibility for funding the relevant
compensation plan.7
America's workers' compensation system is a good example of such a
plan, providing medical and income replacement benefits (as well as
vocational rehabilitation benefits) to those injured by accidents and diseases
arising out of their employment.8 Claims are made against employers (but
not through lawsuits) who generally arrange in advance for the payment of
valid claims via the purchase of workers' compensation insurance. 9 Another
U.S. example is the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program.o
Children who receive vaccinations and then suffer harms that are caused by,
or legally presumed to be caused by, the vaccine are entitled to receive
money benefits from a fund that is financed by a charge imposed on all
vaccinations.1" In Canada, Quebec's pioneering automobile no-fault
insurance scheme is yet another good example.12 All drivers/car-owners are
required to purchase insurance from a special governmental agency that in
turns pays compensation to all of those injured in motor vehicle accidents. 13
New Zealand has for nearly four decades run a unique plan that provides
compensation to all accident victims of whatever sort-work injuries,
automobile injuries, home injuries, recreational injuries, and so on.14
III. THREE KEY ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF THESE SCHEMES
I turn next to three key parameters on which designers of these various
compensation arrangements must focus. The first concerns the nature of the
benefits each scheme will provide. The second concerns the way in which
the different compensation schemes interrelate to each other. The third
concerns whether claimants will be represented by lawyers and, if so, how
the lawyers are to be compensated.
1. With respect to benefit parameters, although I will not cover all of
the issues that arise in the design of a plan's benefits, the discussion will
raise many of the key points. Turning first to income replacement (or
compensation for lost earning capacity), it must first be decided whether the
7. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1171 (1992).
8. See generally KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 5.
9. See supra note 7.
10. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), HEALTH RESOURCES AND
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
11. Stephen D. Sugarman, Cases in Vaccine Court-Legal Battles Over Vaccines and Autism,
357:13 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1275, 1276 (2007).
12. Stephen D. Sugarman, Quebec's Comprehensive Auto No-Fault Scheme and the Failure of
Any of the United States to Follow, 39 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT, numero special, 303 (1998).
13. See generally, Automobile Insurance Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-25 (Can.).
14. GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 115-30 (1979).
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benefit will be standardized or whether it will vary based on the past
earnings history and what is thought would have otherwise been the future
earnings of the individual victim. If the latter, are victims' lost earnings to
be fully replaced, or partially so? If they are to be partially replaced, which,
if any, of the following sorts of limits should apply: (1) the victim bears the
first period (e.g., a week) of lost income; (2) the victim's earnings are
replaced, not fully but at a reduced rate (e.g., 70%); or (3) a maximum limit
is placed on the amount of earning covered (e.g., twice the average weekly
wage in the jurisdiction)?
With respect to medical benefits, how broadly are they defined (e.g.,
including renovations to the homes of victims who are wheelchair bound
and/or including the cost of attendant care for the seriously disabled), what
controls are put on the decision as to whether claimed treatments are needed
(e.g., physical therapy sessions), what limits are placed on the specific health
care providers that victims may utilize, and so on?
Beyond these benefits, which are often termed "pecuniary," are benefits
also to be provided with respect to "non-pecuniary" losses, and if so, how
much and how are they determined? For example, should money be paid to
compensate for the pain and suffering endured by the victim? What about
the victim's lost ability to enjoy life in ways he or she previously did? What
if the victim's body has been seriously disfigured or impaired? And what
about the psychological upset of being harmed, especially if the injurer
carelessly caused it to happen? As with lost income, if there is to be
compensation provided for these harms, is it to be highly individualized or
(relatively) uniform, and are there to be limits on recovery (like thresholds
and ceilings)? 5
Finally, if the victim suffers a long-term injury, should the benefits
provided be paid once in a single lump sum, or should they be paid out over
time? If the former, then it is likely that speculative projections into the
future will be required.' 6 If the latter, will adjustments in the benefits being
paid be made over time as events unfold, or is the periodic payment of
benefits mainly intended to protect the victim paternalistically from
squandering a lump sum award? "
The discussion so far has assumed that the accident victim is the
claimant, but what about situations in which the accident causes the death of
the victim? If death is not instantaneous, are benefits provided to cover the
period between the accident and the death, and if so, which benefits (e.g.,
15. Although outside the scope of my inquiry, which looks only at accidental injuries, plan
designers must also think about instances in which the victim has been harmed by intentional
wrongdoing (or perhaps the reckless disregard of the victim's interest in bodily integrity). Should
additional sums be paid to victims that are designed to punish injurers, and if so, how much should
the penalty be (or should this function be left to the criminal law)?
16. See P.S. ATiYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY 13 (1997).
17. For a brief discussion of structured settlements and periodic payments, see VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 560-61
(12th ed. 2010).
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non-pecuniary benefits)?18  Once the direct victim is dead, are benefits
provided to survivors? If so, which survivors receive those benefits and how
much do they receive (e.g., lump sums, sums relating to the deceased's lost
earnings, sums for grief, etc.)?19
2. Turning now to the way that the compensation schemes interrelate,
the essential point is to appreciate that there are many possible answers. At
one extreme, all of the schemes could ignore each other, and victims would
be able to obtain and keep all the benefits to which they are entitled, even if
this meant triple recovery. At the other, victims would never gain more than
"full" recovery, although this principle alone says nothing about which
scheme (or schemes) winds up bearing the loss. Nor does it say whether
victims could temporarily obtain benefits from one scheme while awaiting
them from another with the obligation to return funds to the prior out of
those obtained from the latter. In between, a variety of solutions could
permit victims to receive different sorts of double, but not triple, recovery.20
So far as tort law is concerned, this issue typically is addressed under
the heading "collateral sources." 21 The common law rule is that collateral
sources are ignored in a tort claim, thereby making tort law always
"primary" in the sense that tort defendants always bear the loss. 22  The
collateral source rule does not address whether victims can double-recover,
however.23 By statute, moreover, in some jurisdictions, the collateral source
rule can be (and has been) revised in two major ways.24 First, tort recovery
may be deemed "secondary" and, hence, only available to the extent that
collateral sources (or at least some of them) do not already cover the
victim's losses.25 Second, tort recovery simply may be repealed with respect
to certain accidents and replaced with recovery via one or more collateral
sources. To the extent that tort law is primary, the other schemes have to
decide whether they will provide double recovery and, if not, whether they
will at least advance benefits pending tort recovery.
As between general social insurance and tailored compensation plans,
similar issues must be resolved, and if there is to be no double recovery, then
it must be decided (a) which source is primary and (b) whether the primary
source is to be a complete substitute or whether the secondary source
18. See id. at 603-05.
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., M.G. WOODROOF ET AL., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW § 5:11
(1974).
21. See generally John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 1478 (1966).
22. Id. at 1478.
23. Id. at 1496-97.
24. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 559.
25. See Fleming, supra note 21, at 548.
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remains available to compensate losses not covered by the primary source.2
Note further that there is more than one way to make, for instance, a tailored
compensation plan that is primary to general social insurance. For example,
with respect to an automobile no-fault plan, the plan might cover the
victim's medical care, but if that care had already been provided by the
country's national health scheme, then either the victim would be required to
reimburse the health plan out of his automobile no-fault recovery or the
automobile no-fault plan itself would directly repay the health plan.27 But
these are not the only options. For example, the health plan might provide
the care, and the automobile plan could provide no health benefits to
individual victims, but the automobile plan could make regular lump-sum
contributions to the health plan that are designed to cover the cost (or
estimated cost) of health care provided to large numbers of automobile
accident victims. Indeed, in what amounts to much of the same thing,
motoring could be taxed (e.g., via gasoline taxes) with proceeds used to an
appropriate degree to fund the health plan.28
Finally, note that the determination of which plan will pay (when it is
assumed that only one will) need not be determined by law but instead by
the choice of the victim. For example, a victim might be entitled to choose
between claiming compensation plan benefits and suing in tort, but he may
not pursue both.
3. Turning now to the role and compensation of lawyers, the pattern is
mixed, not only from country to country but also among the three types of
compensation schemes. In general, lawyers play substantial roles in helping
victims pursue tort claims, and they play only a small or rare role in helping
victims pursue general social insurance benefits. Claims against tailored
compensation plans fall in between, and indeed the participation rate of
lawyers varies among the plans, although it is probably fair to say that the
more serious the injury, the more likely a lawyer will be brought in to
represent the claimant. There are many ways to compensate lawyers for
both sides, which is a matter discussed further below.
IV. THREE REASONS WHY NATIONS' COMPENSATION SCHEMES MIGHT
DIFFER
Although most rich nations have all three of the compensation schemes
described above, each has its own special package of plans. Moreover, in
their details, the schemes vary from place to place in terms of benefit
26. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Tort Reform Through Damages Law Reform: An American
Perspective, 27 SYDNEY L. REv. 507, 508 (2005) [hereinafter Tort Reform]; Stephen D. Sugarman,
A Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 2403, 2422-23 (2000) (discussing
the interplay of insurance and personal injury law).
27. See WOODROOF, supra note 20, § 5.2.
28. See, e.g., Tort Reform, supra note 26, at 516 ("Those especially concerned about social cost
accounting . .. might be placated if a reversal of the collateral source rule were joined with a tax (or
some suitable substitute) on activities whose costs would otherwise be shifted onto basic safety net
benefit schemes.").
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parameters, the interrelationship of the schemes, and the role and
compensation of lawyers. In this part, I will briefly offer three sorts of
considerations that might help explain these differences.
1. Societies may view the purposes of their compensation schemes
differently-especially tort law. Some may see tort law's central role as
deterring socially objectionable (unreasonably dangerous) conduct; others may
see it as helping to put victims back in the position they were before the
accident (focusing on a victim's need); still others may see it as doing justice
between injurer and victim. Of course, societies may value all of these
objectives, though in differing proportions. With respect to both tort law and
tailored compensation schemes, nations may differ in the importance they give
(if any) to internalizing the costs of accidents into the causes of those
accidents.
These different social outlooks might reflect underlying differences in
culture and in political ideology. Does the society think of itself as highly
individualistic or more as a community? Does it believe strongly in personal
responsibility, or do its members more strongly believe that "accidents
happen" and that society holds a collective responsibility for repairing the
consequences of those accidents?
2. Nations have their own histories and experience their own special
pattern of accidents, and perhaps because of path-dependence they find that
their packages of compensation schemes differ as a result.29 For example,
countries experienced industrialization at different times and in different ways,
thereby making workplace injuries a larger social problem in some societies
than in others. Automobile travel too developed differently from place to
place, and likewise, automobile accidents are not equally problematic in all
places. Societies experience different types and frequencies of catastrophes
(whether caused by nature or man), and they face different future catastrophic
risks. These differences can yield different victim-compensation paths.
Further, because nations have differing goveming arrangements, both adding
new compensation arrangements and eliminating or limiting existing ones can
be much more difficult in some places than others.
3. Lawyers are a much more powerful social force in some jurisdictions
than in others. Their own interests, when combined with the political and
social power they can exercise, may yield differing sorts of compensation
schemes. I think it is generally recognized that practicing lawyers play
especially prominent political roles in the United States as compared with
elsewhere.
29. See Anthony J. Sebok, What's Law Got To Do with It? Designing Compensation Schemes in
the Shadow of the Tort System, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 501, 501 (2003) ("It is a banal truism of life that
where one starts off in a journey determines, to a great extent, where one ends up. This banal
observation can be formalized under the rubric of 'path-dependency."').
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V. THREE AREAS IN WHICH NATIONS CAN LEARN (OR HAVE LEARNED)
FROM EACH OTHER REGARDING TORT DAMAGES LAW30
I will not here systematically examine all the features of compensation
plans to which I referred in Part II, but rather I will look at some selected
matters on which U.S. law is (or has been) quite different, in search for
insights that might help improve the law in one place or another. Given the
points I have made in Part III, I acknowledge that what I call an
improvement may well be just my opinion arising from personal values. I
also recognize that achieving change is not always easy, especially when one
opens the argument by pointing to how things are done in foreign places.
Still, my hope is that this comparative exploration can at least help prompt
informed conversations-including among those who never realized that
there are other ways in which things are done.
1. Consider tort compensation for non-pecuniary loss ("pain and
suffering"). The United States is very different from other nations on this
dimension.3 We make juries available to the parties to decide civil
disputes, and they are routinely used in tort cases, whereas most other legal
systems have either never used juries for such cases or have fully or largely
abandoned them." What this means in the U.S. context is that (1) jurors
have little or no past personal experience to go on in awarding to accident
victims damages for non-pecuniary loss, and (2) juries are not given any
instructions by judges as to past awards in similar cases. 3  As a result, in the
United States, each successful claimant may be said to receive a personally
tailored damages award determined by his or her peers.34 On the other hand,
it is widely believed, with respect to non-pecuniary loss, that similar claims
are treated much more variably in the United States than elsewhere.35
Moreover, for reasons that may or may not stem centrally from the use of
juries, U.S. awards for non-pecuniary loss, on average, are far greater than in
other nations (putting aside for the moment cases brought in U.S. states that
30. 1 do not address in this article the matter of substantive tort doctrine, except to note here that
perhaps the most important lead role for American tort law has been to expand the sorts of accidents
and injuries for which legal recovery is allowed. Starting in the 1960s, especially in California and
then in New Jersey, substantive tort doctrine became more and more pro-victim. See, e.g., O'Brien
v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 303 (N.J. 1983) (establishing a pro-victim standard of analysis in
products liability cases); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963)
(holding manufacturers strictly liable for all products placed on the market). I have in mind, for
example, strict product liability rules, claims for emotional distress and wrongful birth, crimes
committed by third parties on the defendant's premises, informed consent and lost chance claims in
medical injury cases, and market-share awards in certain mass injury settings. Whether or not courts
in other nations explicitly chose to follow American tort law when also moving to embrace these
sorts of claims (or at least some of them), surely the lawyers who brought these novel claims in other
nations were, in most instances, aware of U.S. developments.
31. Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards, 55 DEPAUL
L. REv. 399,399 (2006).
32. Id. at 401.
33. Id. at 400,417.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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have imposed a statutory cap on such awards).36
While it may seem like other countries might look to the United States
and find our approach to this issue attractive, largely the opposite has
actually occurred. Most nations have sought both to keep their non-
pecuniary loss awards smaller than ours and to make their awards more
consistent from case to case.
This is not to say that all other nations make similar awards for non-
pecuniary loss or that the U.S. record of very high awards has gone un-
noticed and is decidedly without impact. For example, in recent years in
both England and Italy there has been a substantial upward adjustment in the
amount paid for non-pecuniary loss-a change that, while not obviously
embraced because of U.S. practice, moves those legal systems in the
direction of American patterns." Still, payments in these countries and the
other more generous European (e.g., Ireland) and common law nations (e.g.,
Canada and Australia) still remain well below U.S. levels.
It is also important to appreciate that non-pecuniary loss awards for
various serious harms vary widely among other European nations-with
poorer countries, like Greece and Portugal, and countries with stronger
social welfare systems, like Sweden and Denmark, providing perhaps only
ten percent as much as is provided in higher paying European jurisdictions.40
What is more common among other rich nations, however, is the
existence of a strategy designed to create case-to-case consistency, however
generous or un-generous the nation's legal system is overall. In England and
Germany, for example, careful records are kept as to how much money is
awarded for certain types of harms, such as broken legs, lost eyes,
paraplegia, lost arms, and so on.41  These past award levels are then
carefully followed by judges deciding new cases (with minor adjustments
made where thought appropriate in individual cases).42 In Italy and New
South Wales, Australia, for example, a slightly different approach is used,
yielding essentially the same result.43  There, injuries are assigned a
36. Id at 418.
37. Id. at 432.
38. Idat410.
39. See id at 422-23, 430.
40. See PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS IN EU AND EFTA COUNTRIES (David McIntosh & Majorie
Holmes eds., 2003); Sugarman, supra note 31, at 411; PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH
DAMAGES CALCULATIONS: TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE (John 0. Ward & Robert J. Thornton eds.,
2009).
41. For England, see generally, JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT
OF GENERAL DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES (10th ed. 2010). See also Sugarman, supra
note 31, at 427.
42. Sugarman, supra note 31, at 427.
43. Id. at 426.
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percentage based on severity." In a case before the court, then, once the
victim's disability percentage is determined, the presumptive award for non-
pecuniary loss may be found on a table.45
Together these approaches create what might be termed "scheduled"
awards, a solution that has been recommended by several scholars to U.S.
courts, and which I also favor.46 Notice that this strategy need not require
the elimination of American juries.47 Rather, juries could be given this sort
of data and told that they should either approximately replicate what appears
to be the past pattern of awards for this victim's type of harm, or if they wish
to make a different award (higher or lower), they must give specific reasons
justifying a deviation.48 Based on the reasons given, trial judges could then
decide whether to affirm such deviations or to reject them (in which case the
losing party would perhaps have to either agree to a more typical award or
go through a new trial).
Beyond seeking consistency from case to case, the Canadian Supreme
Court, for example, explicitly acted to rein in awards of non-pecuniary
damages in a way that might also be appropriate for U.S. jurisdictions to
follow. 49 The court initially set a maximum on the award that may be given
to the most seriously harmed victim at $100,000s0 with the understanding
that this ceiling would grow over time with inflation.5 ' At present, the
maximum is about $300,000, which is similar to maxima recently set by
legislation in Australian states.5 2 What should be emphasized here is that
this sort of maximum not only limits what may be awarded to the most
seriously harmed, but also the courts and statutes have made clear that other
injuries are to be scaled down from that maximum. So, for example, if a
victim in New South Wales with a 100% disability rating were to receive
$350,000 in non-pecuniary damages, then a victim with a 50% disability
rating would receive only half as much.
This approach is to be contrasted with the way that U.S. jurisdictions
impose monetary caps on awards for pain and suffering. The U.S. approach
allows juries to make awards as usual, and then, if their award is above the
cap, the judge cuts it off at the cap.5 3 This means that harms of a wide range
44. Id.
45. For Italy, see Giovanni Comand6, Towards a Global Model for Adjudicating Personal Injury
Damages: Bridging Europe and the United States, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 241 (2005);
Sugarman, supra note 31, at 426.
46. See, e.g., Randall Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering, " 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989).
47. Id. at 959.
48. See id.
49. Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [197812 S.C.R. 229,233 (Can.).
50. Id. at 233.
51. Id. at 258.
52. For New South Wales, see Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 2, div 3, s 16 (Austl.) (setting
maximum award for non-economic loss damages awards at $350,000).
53. See David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury
Verdicts in Cahfornia, 23 HEALTH AFF. 54, 54 (2004).
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of seriousness might wind up being compensated at the cap, and nothing is
done in U.S. jurisdictions to scale down the award for less serious harms. 54
Moreover, U.S. caps are generally not adjusted for inflation which seems,
frankly, rather odd." Hence, even if individual states wanted to be more
generous than other nations, they might consider embracing the
Canadian/Australian approach56 by setting, say, $500,000 (adjusted for
inflation) as the amount to be paid to the most gravely injured, with the
understanding that those with lesser harms are to receive awards that are
appropriately scaled down from that ceiling.
Other countries have also adopted strategies that U.S. jurisdictions
might find attractive in dealing with non-pecuniary loss awards for minor
injury cases. One approach, adopted not too long ago in New South Wales,
is to impose a threshold on all personal injury tort claims." There, unless
the injury results in at least a 15% disability, no award is made for what we
in the United States would call pain and suffering." The idea is that these
sorts of harms are either fairly modest or whatever pain and suffering the
victim endured is gone by the time the case is resolved.
One attraction of this solution for U.S. jurisdictions is that it takes away
the leverage that plaintiffs lawyers now have in settling small cases. Both
sides know that defendants are eager to get these cases off their books at a
small cost, and because of that they wind up willing to settle for what many
would think are extravagant pain and suffering sums, given the small scale
of the injury, just because the defense side would incur even higher legal and
other costs in actually defending such claims in court. If one agrees that
U.S. victims now get windfalls in such cases, this threshold strategy is one
way to address the problem.
Indeed, notice that this is roughly the way that Michigan and New York
deal with small injury automobile injury claims under their automobile no-
fault plans.59  Both of these states provide substantial, but not at all
comprehensive, no-fault benefits to cover income loss and medical and
related expenses.o Seriously harmed victims may sue in tort as well both
for pain and suffering and for pecuniary loss not compensated by the plans.6
But those who do not have serious injuries are precluded from seeking
54. Id. at 55, 63.
55. Id. at 56.
56. See, e.g., Bruce A. Thomas, A Canadian View of the Product Liability Aspects of Innovation,
15 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 93, 96 (1989).
57. See Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 2 (Austl.).
58. Id. pt 2, div 3, s 16.
59. See N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5101-09 (McKinney 2005); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 500.3135(1) (West
2006).
60. See N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5101-09; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3135(1).
61. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5104(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3135(1).
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recovery for pain and suffering damages via tort law.62 Neither Michigan
nor New York uses the 15% disabled threshold used in New South Wales.
Instead, they use language, regulations, and past practice to determine
whether the threshold is met or not. Nevertheless, evidence shows that the
pain and suffering thresholds in those two states-when combined with no-
fault benefits for pecuniary losses-take a very substantial share of
automobile cases out of the tort system.
Some Canadian provinces have adopted yet a different approach to
minor injuries. They still allow pain and suffering awards in such cases, but
they have put a fairly low statutory dollar cap ($4000 or less) on such
claims.65 This approach allows for at least some recovery for those who
may have suffered intense, but transient pain, as well as those with lingering
low-level suffering. But it makes clear to both sides in their settlement
negotiations what a modest ceiling on such damages would face the victims
if they went to court. My personal preference is for the New South Wales
approach because it helps concentrate money paid out by the tort system on
the more seriously injured, but I view the Canadian strategy as a creative
compromise.
One other solution worth mentioning is the German practice of giving
some victims (e.g., those injured by certain public utilities) the choice of
suing in tort under a regime of strict liability (i.e., not having to prove
defendant's fault) if they are willing, in exchange, to give up their claim for
pain and suffering damages. 66
In sum, there is a great deal that American jurisdictions might learn
from the treatment elsewhere of damages for non-pecuniary loss. 67 Yet, I
concede that this discussion of non-pecuniary loss recovery is incomplete
without giving attention to the compensation of lawyers, a matter to which I
will turn at the end.
2. More U.S. jurisdictions might consider changing the common law
collateral source rule. Most states still follow the principle that tort recovery
is always primary, although, during the past three decades of "tort reform,"
through efforts pressed on legislatures by defense interests, several
American states have already reversed the collateral source rule with respect
62. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5104(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3135(1).
63. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5102(d) (defining "serious injury").
64. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP
REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 114-15 (May 1985) (reporting on declines
in lawsuits filed in Michigan and New York); Thomas C. Jones, The Michigan Study, in No-FAULT
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN ACTION: THE EXPERIENCES IN MASSACHUSETTS, FLORIDA, DELAWARE
AND MICHIGAN 379,383 (1977) (showing a huge decline in minor tort liability claims in Michigan).
65. E.g., New Brunswick Injury Regulation (Insurance Act), N.B. Reg. 2003-20 § 4 (Can.)
(capping non-pecuniary loss for all minor personal injuries at $2500).
66. See B.S. MARKESINIS, A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION TO THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS 516
(1990).
67. See Tort Refonn, supra note 26, at 512-16 (2005) (discussing U.S. and Australian methods
of compensation for non-economic loss).
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to some other sorts of compensation."
Perhaps most significantly, many legal systems do not allow tort
recovery for medical expenses because the victim pays nothing for those
services and instead merely receives medical treatment from the nation's
health care system. As the United States has just now moved further in that
direction, it seems a good time to consider whether more states should
reverse the collateral source rule with respect to government- or employer-
provided health insurance, as well as with respect to Social Security benefits,
workers' compensation benefits, and other routine employer-based wage-
continuation benefits like sick leave.
A big advantage of such a change, in my view, is to reduce the
complexity of the common law system in which these other sources of
compensation must either seek reimbursement from individual victims or
allow double recovery.
Making tort recovery secondary to other basic social welfare
compensation schemes is generally not popular with those who see tort's
main function as promoting safety by threatening to impose accident costs
on careless injurers and by actually internalizing those accident costs into the
injurers' product or service when harm results because the defendant has
failed to take the proper precautions. But notice that this goal might be
substantially served in other ways. For example, along with altering the
collateral source rule, the state could surcharge liability insurance policies
(or equivalent corporate self-insurance arrangements) and direct the
proceeds to health insurers and other relevant social insurance plans.
3. In light of our growing income inequality and the popular resentment
of the stratospheric earnings of Wall Street plutocrats, it might also be time
for American jurisdictions to reconsider the current practice of having tort
law fully replace lost income (or lost earning capacity). Defenders of the
current regime will argue that individual justice demands full compensation
of victims, and perhaps that this is necessary to achieve tort law's deterrence
goals.69 Yet, from other viewpoints, the common law rule seems unfair and
unnecessary.o
Generally speaking, we all pay the same price for a product that might
injure people with a wide range of income levels. The same goes for those
injured on the premises of others, those injured in transportation accidents,
from medical injuries, and so on. Yet, the full recovery principle means that
a rich victim gets more out of the tort system for the same injury than does a
68. Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law
Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REv. 207, 223 n.60 (1990).
69. Tort Reform, supra note 26, at 509.
70. Id. at 509-10.
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poor victim. 71 This seems undesirably regressive. Moreover, those with
high incomes typically do not, and should not, need full recovery from tort
law to make them whole with respect to their lost earnings. That is because
higher earners tend to have, and if prudent should have, private disability
insurance that already protects their income from a variety of risks including
accidents that might lead to tort claims.
One way to alter tort law to deal with this issue is to restrict damages for
income replacement in some way. Indeed, this has happened recently in
Australia. In a change that I find quite attractive, New South Wales tort law
now replaces lost earnings up to a maximum of three times the annual
average earnings of full-time adult workers.72 This would not be as
revolutionary a change for the United States as it might appear at first blush
once one considers that all of our workers' compensation plans, as well as
our Social Security system, already place a limit on the amount of past
wages that are considered in making benefit awards.
An additional (and I believe sensible) reform would be to impose a
modest deductible on income replacement by, say, having the first week of
lost earnings fall to the victim. This is an amount that can be absorbed by
most workers, especially those with paid sick leave (an employee benefit
that the United States should make mandatory, but alas so far has not).74
This sort of provision would also mimic a common feature of workers'
compensation laws and the laws of the five U.S. states that provide short-
term income replacement for non-occupational disabilities. When
combined with the earlier-discussed changes in compensation for non-
pecuniary losses and the collateral source rule, this would rid tort law of a
huge number of small claims-leaving the tort system to focus on, and
better focus its benefits on, the more seriously injured, which is a shift that I
favor.
VI. THREE AREAS IN WHICH NATIONS CAN LEARN (OR HAVE LEARNED)
FROM EACH OTHER REGARDING SOCIAL INSURANCE AND TAILORED
COMPENSATION PLANS
Trying to get government to do more for victims is an uphill battle in a
time of high unemployment and resistance to larger deficits. Moreover, in
the United States especially, given the power of the plaintiffs' bar, it is never
easy to make political headway with changes that would threaten lawyers'
business, even if victims and consumers would, overall, be better off. Still,
there are some win-win possibilities out there.
1. It is important to appreciate that nations differ in the ways they have
71. Id. at 509.
72. Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 12 (Austl.).
73. Stephen D. Sugarman, Short Term Paid Leave: A New Approach to Social Insurance and
Employee Benefits, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 467 (1987).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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made important tailored compensation plans either full, or only partial
substitutes for tort law.76  For example, in the United States, workers'
compensation plans are, broadly speaking, complete substitutes for tort law.
To be sure, in the rare instances in which employers intentionally harm
victims, a tort remedy is likely to be available, and one who suffers a work
injury may also sue a third party tortfeasor, such as the maker of a defective
product that injured the plaintiff on the job. But, in the overwhelming share
of work injuries, the victim's claim is exclusively against the employer and
only under the workers' compensation scheme and not in tort.n
The American solution may seem obvious or natural here, but in most
other places with workers' compensation plans, victims may sue in tort as
well. 78 Normally they may only sue for losses not already covered by the
workers' compensation scheme, but still, in serious injury cases, those
losses-both with respect to income and pain and suffering-could be very
substantial. In my view, a better solution is to liberalize workers'
compensation benefits and keep the American complete substitute solution.
By contrast to U.S. workers' compensation rules, as already noted,
America's two most generous automobile no-fault states (Michigan and New
York) have put in place plans that are only partial substitutes for tort law.79
Yet, in places like Quebec and Israel, automobile no-fault plans, like our
workers' compensation plans, are complete substitutes for tort claims.80 It is
also important to understand that in both Quebec and Israel, seriously
injured automobile victims obtain some recovery from the no-fault scheme
for pain and suffering.8' This too is sharply at odds with American workers'
compensation schemes, which do not provide such benefits.82
Overall, I believe that American victims and consumers would
substantially benefit if (1) we adopted a Quebec/Israeli type, automobile no-
fault scheme that fully replaces tort law, 8 and (2) we added moderate levels
of pain and suffering benefits for seriously injured workers to our existing
exclusive-remedy workers' compensation plans. This package, I believe,
would be cheaper for consumers and would provide improved benefits for a
large share of the seriously injured.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Tort Reform, supra note 26, at 510.
79. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
80. Tort Reform, supra note 26, at 511.
81. Id.
82. Awards that some states make that are based upon specific impairments, like loss of an arm
or loss of an eye, are usually intended more as proxies for presumed income loss than for pain and
suffering.
83. STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, "PAY AT THE PUMP" AUTO INSURANCE: THE CALIFORNIA INJURY
PLAN (VIP) FOR BETTER COMPENSATION, FAIRER FUNDING, AND GREATER SAFETY 5 (1993).
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2. Many nations might be well served by adopting more tailored
compensation schemes than they have at present. Northern Ireland and
Israel, for example, have plans that cover terrorism victims that might be
explored elsewhere.84 Sweden has a plan for medical injuries that is worth
studying. Many creative compensation plans for other recurrent or
potentially catastrophic accidents have been proposed over the years in the
United States (e.g., for side effects of pharmaceutical drugs) and are worth
reconsidering.
All countries might profit from reconsidering their compensation
approach to airplane accident victims-especially those killed in commercial
air crashes.8 ' Rather than having heirs sue the airlines in tort, where they are
required to prove negligence on the part of the defendant's employees (and
then recover losses based on the victim's past earnings), perhaps it would be
more fair and administratively much more efficient to provide a uniform life
insurance policy (of, say, $500,000) as part of the ticket price for all
passengers, the proceeds of which would be paid out to the passenger's heirs
in exchange for precluding a wrongful death tort claim. This approach,
which I find attractive, would treat with equal dignity the death of each
passenger. 87
This solution would allow those with substantial earning power the
option to buy what they believe to be an appropriate amount of personal life
insurance as a supplement to the policy provided by the airlines-policies
that most people would (wisely) buy that would cover death in general and
would not be restricted to airplane-crash death.88 In fact, financially better-
off passengers with dependent family members already typically have
general life insurance policies (or other mechanisms providing financial
security to their families) with the result that the benefit paid by those
policies now duplicates recovery that is currently available to survivors who
succeed in a tort claim. Also, in the same vein as suggested earlier of those
who are keen to have carefully calibrated financial incentives intended to
stimulate airline safety, fines might be imposed on a carrier when
government inspectors (who examine all commercial crashes anyway)
determine that a plane crashed due to carrier negligence." The proceeds of
such penalties could, for example, be put toward the construction of newer
and safer airports or to support the national air control system.
In the spirit of treating all victims the same, it is worth noting how the
84. But see Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Case for Specially Compensating the
Victims of Terrorist Acts: An Assessment, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 901 (2007).
85. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Right and Wrong Ways of Doing Away with Commercial Air
Crash Litigation: Professor Chalk's "Market Insurance Plan" and Other No-Fault Follies, 52 J.
AIR L. & COM. 681 (1987).
86. See id. at 686 (proposing an ideal plan in a "typical" no-fault system).
87. See id at 687.
88. See id. at 686-88 (comparing two different no-fault systems using insurance).
89. Cf 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 40113-14 (West 2006) (describing the Federal Aviation Administration's
responsibility to investigate and report).
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U.S. 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund treated the families of those killed by
the terrorists who crashed the four airplanes in the September 11, 2001
attacks.90  The scheme's special administrator, Kenneth Feinberg, first
decided that the fund would award $250,000 in non-pecuniary benefits for
each life lost,9 ' wisely and fairly refusing to treat families differently based
on claims about how much the deceased suffered in the final moments
before death.92 To that flat sum, he also added flat sums if the deceased left
a surviving spouse and/or children. 93
Feinberg was additionally required by statute to pay benefits that
reflected the lost earning power of the deceased to survivors. 94  This, all
other things being equal, meant paying much larger sums to the families of
high-wage earners as compared with low-wage earners-which, of course, is
the tort law tradition, as well as the way Social Security works and the way
workers' compensation generally works.95  But after the program was
wound up, Feinberg wrote that he felt it would have been fairer, as a special
one-time benefit that acknowledged that these nearly 3000 people had
altogether involuntarily lost their lives to terrorism, if the entire award to
each surviving family would have been the same amount.96 Some, both in
the United States and abroad, might find this to be an attractive way to deal
with death caused in a wide range of ways.
3. Nations might learn from each other about how tailored
compensation plans are meshed with other forms of recovery. For example,
if a society has a true national health insurance scheme, what is the point of
having medical care connected to work-related injuries be separately
covered by workers' compensation plans as it is today in the United States?
So, as America moves toward finally catching up with the rest of the world
in having a comprehensive health care scheme,97 I believe that our states
should consider stripping those benefits from workers' compensation.
Those benefits made much more sense a century ago when there was no
other source of health insurance for workers. For those who are eager to
90. See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating Victims of
September 11, 49 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 573 (2001).
91. See id. at 582.
92. See id at 585.
93. See id.
94. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 34-35 (2005).
95. See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 85, at 685 (workers' compensation is based on lost earning
power); see also Rabin, supra note 90, at 584 n.60 (benefits in workers' compensation cases are
usually calculated by a percentage of decedent's weekly wage).
96. FEINBERG, supra note 94, at 182-83.
97. See Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/
diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/healthinsurance and managedcare/healthcarerefom/index.h
tml (last updated Dec. 13, 2010).
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have these work-related costs internalized into the cost of the relevant
employer's goods or services, note that this already happens if the employer
provides health insurance to its employees. Indeed, at present, the vast share
of workers has duplicate sources to cover health care benefits for work-
related injuries. As a result, workers and the two relevant insurers have to
go through administrative busywork to sort out regarding which carrier
should ultimately bear the cost.
The 9/11 Compensation Plan ("9/11 Plan") contained one highly
controversial feature for a tailored compensation plan: the benefits otherwise
payable to survivors of those killed on 9/11 were fully reduced by the
amount of life insurance the victim had.98 This is a very rare feature, as
normally workers' compensation, automobile no-fault plans, and other
tailored compensation schemes ignore life insurance, which is treated as
intended-to serve as a voluntary supplement to other benefits.99 Indeed,
even the jurisdictions that have reversed somewhat the collateral source rule
for torts cases have not included life insurance proceeds as money to be
deducted from the otherwise appropriate tort damages award.
Nonetheless, this feature of the 9/11 Plan had the twin virtues of making
the plan benefits more carefully tailored to the actual need of the survivors
and helping to keep the plan benefits from being even more heavily
concentrated on the families of high earners. On the other side, however,
survivors understandably howled when they received less from the plan than
did otherwise identically situated families whose now deceased breadwinner
voluntarily and irresponsibly chose not to purchase life insurance for his or
her family but instead, for example, spent those would-be premium dollars
on an expensive automobile.'o Moreover, it is rumored that a large share of
the relatively few families (perhaps 100 of 3000) that refused to seek funds
from the 9/11 Plan and instead sued the airlines (and others) in tort did so
because their now-dead loved ones had large life insurance policies, and as a
result their 9/11 Plan benefits would have been very small. This experience
suggests that Congress may have gotten the social balance wrong in the way
it meshed 9/11 Plan benefits with other compensation sources.
Lastly, in meshing compensation plans and tort, several U.S. plans, both
existing and proposed, include creative and somewhat varying options.
Under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program ("Vaccine
Plan"), for example, those who say that they or their children have been
injured as a side effect of having been vaccinated must first file a claim for
benefits under the program.'o' The plan administrators then determine
whether the claimant is eligiblel 02 and, if so, how much money is
98. FEINBERG, supra note 94, at 35-36; see Rabin, supra note 90, at 578.
99. See Rabin, supra note 90, at 579-80.
100. Seeidat583.
101. Filing a Claim with the VICP, HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, http://
www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/filingclaim.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
102. Persons Eligible to File a Claim, HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/persons-eligible.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2010)
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appropriate to distribute. At that point the claimant has a choice-either
accept the plan's offer or reject it forever and, if he or she wishes, then sue
in tort. In this way the two compensation arrangements are exclusive from
one another, but it is up to claimants to choose a scheme.
The 9/11 Compensation Plan had a somewhat similar feature. If one
filed a claim against the Fund, one could not sue in tort.'03 Unlike the
Vaccine Plan, survivors were not required to first file with the fund to see
what it would offer. To the contrary, if they did that, they were bound by
what the fund decided to provide to them and forfeited their right to opt out
and to sue the fund.'04 To help potential claimants figure out for themselves
which route to take, the 9/11 Plan's administrator published extensive
documentation setting out how benefits would be determined so that
potential claimants and their advisors could be reasonably sure of what their
benefit under the plan would be were they to file.'0o
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has proposed a wide range of cleverly
constructed choice schemes. To give but one example here, O'Connell
designed a scheme in which motorists would, in advance of any accident,
decide whether they wanted to be in the tort system or the no-fault system by
buying one or the other type of insurance.' 06 If two no-fault electing drivers
crashed into each other, each of them could claim only no-fault benefits and
only from his or her own insurer.' 07 If two tort-electing drivers crashed into
each other, they could claim from each other in tort, provided, of course,
they could prove the other was at fault. 08 In one-car crashes, the no-fault
electing driver could claim no-fault benefits from his or her insurer, and the
tort-electing driver presumably would get no automobile insurance-related
recovery, as he or she would have no one to sue in tort (putting aside
situations in which the crash came about through a defective car or
unreasonably maintained roads, etc.).' 09
If a no-fault plan driver and a tort-system driver were involved in a
crash, O'Connell proposed that the no-fault driver would claim from his or
her no-fault plan."o The tort system driver could not sue the no-fault plan
driver because the latter was immune from tort claims by having elected the
(outlining the parameters for eligibility).
103. See Rabin, supra note 90, at 586; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 84, at 908.
104. See Rabin, supra note 90, at 586.
105. See id
106. See Jeffrey O'Connell, No-Fault Auto Insurance: Back by Popular (Market) Demand?, 26
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 993 (1989).
107. Id. at 996.
108. Id.
109. See id
110. See id.
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no-fault regime."'1  But the tort system victim could claim from the
"uninsured motorist" portion of his own automobile insurance-provided he
could prove that the no-fault system driver had been at fault in causing the
accident.112 While it might at first seem unfair that the tort system driver
had to pay for "uninsured motorist" insurance in this setting, notice how, as
an offset, the tort system driver's liability insurance premium would be
reduced under O'Connell's scheme as other drivers opted for no-fault and
thereby gave up their right to sue tort system drivers.1 13
In fact, O'Connell believed that this ingenious scheme would function
only in rare cases because he was confident that in short order most drivers
would opt for the no-fault alternative, finding it not only substantially
cheaper but also to provide no- (or lower-) hassle benefits regardless of who
was at fault.114  But so far, we have had no opportunity to test this
prediction, as no state has embraced his proposal. Indeed, when Arizona
voters were presented with the opportunity to put it into play, they rejected
the idea." 5 For now, it is important at least to note that, in contrast with the
choice features of the 9/11 Plan and the Vaccine Plan, O'Connell's
automobile no-fault choice plan calls for people to make a choice before any
injuries take place.
VII. THREE WAYS IN WHICH LAWYER COMPENSATION MIGHT BE
ARRANGED
1. Defense lawyers under the American tort system are paid by
defendants or by defendant insurance companies as part of the insurance
contract"'6 (a routine feature of motor vehicle liability insurance policies, for
example). These lawyers are normally paid on an hourly basis." 7 Claimant
lawyers under the American system are almost always paid on a so-called
contingent fee basis." 8 This arrangement has two important features. First,
it means that the lawyers are only paid if they win, so that to some degree,
winning claimants help fund the work done for losing claimants. The other
feature is that when they win, the lawyers are paid a percentage of the
award. This need not be the only form of payment. They could simply
receive, for example, an extravagant hourly rate if they win. Nonetheless,
the percentage-fee system is solidly in place, and a typical fee in torts cases
is 33%, at least if the case settles. Sometimes, however, claimants can
I 11. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See id at 994; see also Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First Party Insurance:
Advantages and Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 611, 621 (2000).
115. See ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW § 1:2C, at 26 (2d ed.
2002).
116. Robert H. Mnookin, Negotiation, Settlement and the Contingent Fee, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
363, 365 (1998).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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negotiate a lower percentage, and sometimes the agreed percentage can go
up to, for example, 50% if the lawyer has to try the case and further defend a
verdict on appeal." 9
California has restricted attorneys' fees in medical malpractice cases by
statute, allowing lawyers to charge no more than 40% of awards up to
$50,000; 33.33% of the next $50,000 of recovery; 25% of the next
$500,000; and 15% on all recovery beyond that.12 0 This schedule appears to
be based on the theory that relatively little extra work is required to obtain
higher sums for victims. Because most medical malpractice cases that are
brought involve substantial injuries, the upshot of the schedule is to reduce
considerably the fees that successful lawyers would otherwise earn.'2 '
While this has the effect of allowing victims to keep a greater share of their
recovery, it has reportedly also meant that many experienced trial lawyers
have left the practice of medical malpractice cases, leaving claimants
potentially without representation or representation by less competent
counsel.122 Sometimes, then, victims might be financially worse off under
the restricted fee regime than they would be under the conventional U.S. fee
arrangement.123
2. This American practice of each side paying its own fees is atypical
worldwide.124  Many legal systems use a "loser pays" scheme.125  This
means that if the case goes to trial and the defendant wins, the plaintiff not
only must pay his or her own lawyer (note the contrast with the U.S. system,
where 33% of 0 is 0), but the plaintiff must also pay the defendant's legal
fees (as approved by the court).12 6 As this could be a considerable sum, this
rule is said to discourage many claimants who do not feel confident that they
have a winning case.127 From the societal perspective, this contrast means
that in the United States the lawyers who represent victims play the role of
screening out weak cases because they will earn nothing if no recovery is
obtained.128 In other systems, victims themselves (to be sure after obtaining
119. See Miss. State Bar v. Blackmon, 600 So. 2d 166, 176 (Miss. 1992) (Banks, J., dissenting);
Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1986).
120. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a) (West 2003).
121. See Jane E. Reames, Contingency Fees: Victim or Contributing Cause of Medical
Malpractice Reform Acts?, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 271, 283 (1985).
122. See id at 284.
123. See id. at 288.
124. See W. Kent Davis, The International View ofAttorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United
States the "Odd Man Out" in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 361, 400
(1999); see also Walter Olson, Loser Pays, POINTOFLAW.COM (May 21, 2004), http://www.pointof
law.com/loserpays/overview.php.
125. See Davis, supra note 124, at 400.
126. See id. at 403.
127. See id. at 408.
128. See id at 377-78.
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initial legal advice) must serve the function of holding back on bringing
weak cases.12 9 Of course, victims with no real assets and little income
would be in no position actually to pay either side's legal fees if their cases
were lost. 30 In the United States, they can still find representation for
decent claims.' 3 1 Elsewhere, usually some legal assistance scheme is
required to ensure representation in what might be viewed as somewhat
borderline cases.132
Note also that in most places under the "loser pays" scheme, the lawyers
are paid for the work they do--either so much for each task or so much per
hour-although England recently has begun to introduce percentage fees on
the claimant side. It is widely believed that lawyers on both sides of cases
earn considerably less outside the United States than they do here for the
handling of similar cases. 113
Of course, if the claimant wins in court or obtains a settlement, then-at
least in principle-in most other countries the claimant is able to retain the
full amount of his or her recovery because the other side must cover his or
her legal fees.134 This principle is sometimes breached in countries where
the loser is required to pay a sum that is understood to be well less than the
fair legal cost of representing the victim and where the claimant's lawyer is
permitted to charge the client the difference. In those instances some of the
recovery goes to the lawyer, but as a general rule that amount is far less than
it would be in the United States.
This difference in the compensation of lawyers is one very important
reason why comparisons of gross awards in tort cases between the United
States and elsewhere are misleading. If one assumes, as I do, that as a
psychological matter, the American claimant thinks of his or her legal fees
as coming out of the portion of the recovery allocated to pain and suffering,
then one must take that into account when discussing the enormously higher
awards for non-pecuniary loss made in the United States.'35 I have shown
elsewhere that unless U.S. pain and suffering awards are several times the
amount awarded for pecuniary loss, then the U.S. situation is no longer the
outlier that it initially appears to be in comparison with the higher-paying
European and common law nations.' 6 To be sure, in many individual cases
American claimants do win pain and suffering awards that are a very large
share of the total award, but in cases where plaintiffs are gravely injured, this
129. See id at 408.
130. Seeidat410.
131. See idat 377-78.
132. See id at 410; see, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AID: REFOCUSING ON PRIORITY
CASES, 2009, C.P. 12/09, at 8 (U.K.) (demonstrating that "borderline" cases may be considered for
legal assistance schemes where public interest considerations outweigh benefits to the individual
litigants alone).
133. See Sugarman,supra note 31, at40l.
134. See id, at 419.
135. Seeid at 401.
136. Id. at 421-22.
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may not be so because the pecuniary award is so enormous. 37
To me, this means that in the United States, any statutory reform of rules
governing pain and suffering should take into account-and perhaps also
reform-the rules on legal fees.'38 This has not happened, with the result
that where pain and suffering awards are now limited in some U.S.
jurisdictions to $250,000 or less, the actual sum retained by victims is much
less than in comparable cases in other nations. 139 Indeed, often the victim's
legal fee will be more than the full amount of his or her pain and suffering
award so that some of the fee will have to come out of the rest of his or her
damages.140 In such cases, claimants are probably financially worse off in
those states than are their counterparts in even those European nations that
pay very little for non-pecuniary loss (like Denmark).141
3. These considerations lead me to favor a reform in the United States
that would simultaneously change both the rules for recovery for pain and
suffering and the rules for compensating lawyers. As for the former, I will
add nothing here to the idea advanced in an earlier section about limiting
pain and suffering recovery to, say, $500,000 (adjusted for inflation) for the
most seriously injured, with recovery scaled down from there for lesser
injuries (perhaps with juries being informed of the pattern of past awards in
the hope of gaining greater consistency).142
As for legal fees in this new regime, I suggest a third way. Victims
would never pay. If they lose, their own lawyer remains uncompensated (as
they do now), but defendants would still have to pay their own lawyers (as
they do now). But if claimants win, instead of their legal fees coming out of
their award, defendants would pay those costs. While this is, of course, a
new cost to defendants, it is offset by the reduced cost of pain and suffering
awards that is part of the package.
Moreover, I also propose altering the way in which the victim's legal
fees would be determined. I recommend keeping a percentage-fee basis but
altering the percentage amount from the somewhat typical 33% now used.
Instead, I would favor a regime something like the following. 143  If the
defendant offers a settlement within, say, ninety days of the time the case is
filed and the settlement is accepted, the lawyer for the claimant is paid an
137. Id. at 422.
138. See id. at 430-33.
139. Id. at 427-28.
140. See id. at 428.
141. See id; Stephen D. Sugarman, The Legal Sting of Pain and Suffering, L.A. TIMES, June 5,
2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/05/opinion/oe-sugannan5. To be sure, this analysis is
further complicated to the extent that nations also differ in the amounts they award for pecuniary loss
in comparable cases, a matter I put aside here.
142. See supra text accompanying note 56; see also Sugarman, supra note 31, at 430.
143. Cf Tort Reform, supra note 26, at 522 (offering an earlier version of this proposed regime).
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amount equal to 10% of the settlement amount as the fee. If no settlement
offer is made or if there is no settlement, and the case goes ahead, then the
claimant's lawyer's fee is 10% of the amount of the initial settlement offer
(if any) plus 40% of any amount obtained above the initial settlement offer.
This approach is based on the idea that at the start of the case, the
claimant's lawyer has made only a modest effort, and hence a 10% fee is fair
enough. Moreover, this arrangement strongly encourages the defendant to
make a fair offer early on so as to keep her cost of the claimant's lawyer to a
minimum. If the defendant is not forthcoming, then the claimant's lawyer's
work typically becomes substantial and would be generously rewarded under
my proposal.
This same sort of solution might be employed to compensate lawyers
who represent claimants seeking benefits from tailored compensation plans
and social insurance. Today, most people who file for Social Security do not
use lawyers, but most of those claims are for retirement and survivor
benefits that are usually not controversial as to eligibility or amount. On the
other hand, many claimants seeking total disability benefits, especially those
initially rejected, do turn to legal help in proving their disability. The same
pattern applies to workers' compensation claims. The vast majority of
claims are handled without lawyers, but when it comes to claims for
permanent partial disability or total disability, lawyers often appear. For the
9/11 Plan, plaintiff tort lawyers around the nation volunteered to help people
with claims against the plan on a pro bono basis, although a small number of
families eventually hired attorneys to represent them.'" Many-perhaps
most--claimants under the Vaccine Plan have lawyers representing them.
Most of the lawyers who get involved with these cases today generally
take them on a contingency fee basis with the fee paid out of the claimant's
award. But the percentage of the award the lawyers take as a fee is generally
considerably lower than in tort cases. For example, the traditional workers'
compensation fee has been 10%, and often in these cases the client and the
defendant insurer agree to a lump-sum payment insisted of ongoing monthly
benefits. Among other things, this allows the lawyer to get the fee all at
once, and the amount on which it is based is clear. Lawyers handling Social
Security disability claims tend to get 25% of the back benefits they win for
their clients (which generally is far less than 25% of the discounted present
value of the entire award that has been won).
The Vaccine Plan, however, provides something of a precedent for my
proposal. There, provided some minimal requirements are met, the plan will
pay reasonable legal fees to lawyers who help people file claims. Indeed,
reasonable legal fees are paid by the plan even in cases where benefits are
denied. It might have been wise to have a similar arrangement for the 9/11
Plan. But as already noted, that turned out to be unnecessary. Wanting to
appear patriotic and not wanting to appear to be profiting off the terrorist
144. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Speech: Negotiating the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund
of 2001: Mass Tort Resolution Without Litigation, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 21, 29, (2005).
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events of 9/11, the personal injury plaintiffs' bar generously agreed to pitch
in for free on behalf of those who lost a loved one.145
The general principle I support, then, is that instead of having the
claimant pay for his or her lawyer, the compensation plan should pay a
reasonable fee to the claimant's lawyer in situations where we can have
some confidence that the lawyer made a difference. For some plans, perhaps
this means the plan should only have to pay after the claimant made an
initial claim that was rejected (or only a low sum was offered) and now a
lawyer participates so that the claim is recognized (or a much larger sum is
offered). As with tort claims, the fee should be structured both to reward the
effective lawyer without having to take the fee out of the victim's recovery
and to entice the plan to make a reasonable offer before the lawyer must
make a substantial effort on behalf of the client. Schemes like the Vaccine
Plan seem to be different because the mounting of the initial claim can be
quite difficult and waiting for a claim to be denied before offering to pay the
claimant's lawyer does not make sense.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When it comes to the money paid to those who suffer personal injury by
accident, U.S. law has not had a major impact on the laws of other rich
nations, and perhaps that is just as well. To the contrary, the United States
could benefit substantially by embracing aspects of the laws of other nations
with respect to social insurance, tailored compensation plans, and tort law.
These changes would still leave the United States with a robust (albeit
reduced) tort law and a much stronger set of other compensation
arrangements. These together, I believe, would constitute a package that
would be more attractive to Justice Linden than our current package. If so, I
urge advocacy on behalf of these reforms as a tribute to him.
145. See id. at 29.
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